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Case No. 20090383-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Sitamipa Ulisis Toki,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for discharging a firearm, with an inconcert enhancement, a second degree felony, possession of a dangerous weapon, a
second degree felony, and threatening with a dangerous weapon, a class A
misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78 A-4-103(2)(e)
(West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error by mentioning Defendant's
"restricted person" status to the jury?
Standard of Review. Because Defendant invited the error of which he
complains, appellate review by this Court is not available. See State v. Winfield, 2006
UT 4,11f 14-16,128 P.3d 1171.

2. Did the trial judge abuse his discretion when it rejected Defendant's
request for individual juror voir dire of a lunchtime altercation in favor of a single
cautionary instruction to the jury?
Standard ofReview. A trial court has broad discretion to respond to courtroom
events and to control the proceedings before it. See State v. Tueller, 2001UT App 317,
112,37 P.3d 1180 (" [W]e conclude that the trial judge acted within his discretion in
responding to events in his courtroom/7); State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918,925 (Utah
App. 1990) ("Trial courts have the discretion to determine whether a curative
instruction is required in a particular case.") (citation omitted).
3. Did the trial judge abuse his discretion in admitting gang-related evidence
for purposes of identity and in-concert enhancement?
Standard of Review. "Determining questions of relevance and the balancing of
probative and prejudicial values are both tasks for which the trial court is granted
discretion, and [this Court] will reverse the trial court's decision on these matters
only when it abuses such discretion/' State v. Schwenke, 2009 UT App 345, f 9, 222
P.3d 768 (alteration added), cert, denied, 230 P.3d 127 (Utah 2010).
4. Does the cumulative effect of any errors in this case undermine this Court's
confidence that Defendant had a fair trial?

2

Standard of Review. "Under the cumulative error doctrine, [an appellate court]
will reverse only if the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines [its]
confidence... that a fair trial was had." State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, ^ 74,125 P.3d
878 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Gallegos, 2009
UT 42, \ 39,220 P.3d 136, reh'g. denied, Nov. 17,2009.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Copies of Utah Rules of Evidence 402 and 403 are attached in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant and two co-defendants—David Kamoto and Daniel Maumau—
were charged in February 2007 with discharging a firearm from a vehicle or toward
a person, building or vehicle, with an enhancement for acting in concert with others,
a second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508 (West Supp.
2007).1 R.5-6. Defendant was also charged with possession or use of a firearm by a
restricted person, a second degree felony, in violation of § 76-10-503(2)(a) (West
2004); and aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-103 (West 2004). R. 5-7. Defendant was bound over as charged following a
preliminary hearing and entered a not-guilty plea. R. 18-20,30-31.

1

Co-defendant Maumau entered a guilty plea to aggravated assault. R.
226:517. Co-defendant Kamoto was tried jointly with Defendant Toki. R. 225-27.
3

Before trial, Defendant moved to sever the offense of possession of a firearm
by a restricted person from the other offenses for purposes of trial. R. 53-54. The
State suggested bifurcating the restricted person element, Defendant agreed to that
alternative, and the court did so. R. 70-71; R. 222:5-6; R. 223:3.
The prosecutor filed a pre-trial notice of intent to call expert witnesses,
including Detective Break Merino. R. 39-40. Detective Merino was to testify as an
expert in gang recognition, behavior, membership, and conflicts relating to the
Tongan Crip Gang ["T.CG."]. R. 39. On the first day of trial, counsel for codefendant Kamoto objected to the testimony based on reliability, relevance, and
prejudice, and Defendant's counsel joined in the objection. R. 225:9-10. The State
represented that because witnesses initially identified co-defendant Kamoto by gang
moniker only, the officer would connect the monikers to the particular defendants.
R. 225:11-12, 14-15. Further, the witness would help establish that Defendant,
Kamoto, and Maumau were knowingly acting in concert based on their use of blue
bandanas, the gang meaning behind that use, and the knowledge of all three men of
that meaning in light of their gang membership. R. 225:12. The court admitted the
testimony, finding it relevant and holding that "it's more probative than prejudicial
in the context of the facts that are before us in this particular case/' R. 225:9-16.
Both defense counsel renewed their objection during trial, and Defendant's counsel
4

unsuccessfully sought a mistrial based on the detective's testimony. R. 226:523,529,
536.
During the second day of trial, an altercation occurred between the two sets of
doors at the front of the courtroom, just after the jury had been excused for lunch.
R. 186, 204; R. 226:372-74. The judge discussed the situation with counsel before
deciding to remove from the crowded courtroom five people identified as having
some connection to the altercation. R. 204; R. 226:380-84. When the jury thereafter
returned, the judge issued a cautionary instruction, informing jurors that an
altercation had occurred in the hallway, but that it did not involve any of the
witnesses or parties to these proceedings. R. 226:373-86. He did not mention
removal of the five individuals. Id.
Following a three-day trial, the jury convicted Defendant of discharge of a
firearm with the in-concert enhancement, but acquitted Kamoto of the same charge.
R. 112-13. The jury also convicted Defendant of possession of a firearm, acquitted
him of aggravated assault, and convicted him of the lesser included offense of
threatening with a dangerous weapon, a class A misdemeanor, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (West 2004). R. 75-76,103-06,112,202. The judge sentenced
Defendant to two terms of one-to-fifteen-years in the Utah State Prison for the two

5

second degree felonies, running the sentences consecutive to each other and to any
other sentence Defendant may serve.2 R. 167-68.
Defendant moved for access to juror information to assess the impact of the
hallway altercation on the jurors. He also sought a new trial, challenging the expert
testimony of Detective Merino and the failure of the court to ask some of
Defendant's voir dire questions. R. 169-82. Following submission of memoranda
and oral argument, the trial court denied both requests. R. 169-82,185-96, 201-07.
The court ruled;
1. Defendant not only failed to preserve the alleged error in the
questioning of the jury, but he invited any error;
2. Defendant did not establish that any juror witnessed the hallway
brawl, only five people were asked to leave the courtroom, and the
court's instruction to the jurors minimized any possible prejudice; and
3. Detective Merino's testimony was admissible under rule 404(b) as it
was relevant to establishing the elements of the group enhancement
charge to which Defendant had entered a not guilty plea and its
probative value "outweighed any prejudicial impact" the testimony
may have had.
R. 203-06 (ruling attached in Addendum B). Defendant timely appealed. R. 208-09.

2

The jury acquitted Defendant of aggravated assault, but was instructed on
and convicted Defendant of the lesser included offense of threatening with a
dangerous weapon. R. 112-13, 156. However, no reference to this conviction
appears in the sentencing proceedings. R. 167-68; R. 228:passim.
6

STATEMENT OF FACTS
"The car... was bouncing"
In the early hours of February 3, 2007, a family party was underway in the
carport of a Kearns home.3 R. 225:153-54,197-98; R. 226:296-97,335. The front and
side of the carport was covered were each covered from floor to ceiling by a blue
tarp. R. 225:155,200; R. 226:300-01. The party had begun around 10 p.m. the night
before, and the drink of choice was beer. R. 225:197-99; R. 226:298,335.
Mele Faamausili was enjoying the party with her family, but left around 2:00
in the morning. 4 R. 226:334-36. She had been exchanging texts with Defendant,
who had invited her to a party on the East side of the valley.5 R. 226:336-39. She
left the party at the Kearns house to meet Defendant. R. 226:336-37. She drove
away in a friend's SUV despite having drunk several beers, and she continued to
drink at the new party. R. 226:336-37,339-41,394-95.
Around 4:00 a.m., some of Mele's relatives noticed that she was gone. R.
225:156-57, 204. Myla Faamausili, Mele's aunt, tried calling Mele's cell phone but

3

The State recites the facts in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See
State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, f 2,128 P.3d 1179 (citation omitted).
4

Mele was also known as "Mary." R. 225:174; R. 226:297, 334.

5

Mele also identified Defendant by the name "Toc-Locc" when she first spoke
to police after the incident. R. 227:568.
7

got no answer. R. 225:156-57; R. 226:334. Between 5:00 and 6:00 that morning,
Camilla Faamausili Tuiloma took one of her cousins home. R. 225:157,206. Within
minutes of arriving home, the cousin called the Kearns party to say that he had
noticed the missing SUV parked up the street from his house. R. 225:157.
Myla, Camilla, and Myla's nephew Magic left the party around 5:30 or 6:00 to
find the SUV.6 R. 225:158, 206; R. 226:334. When they found it, the car was
bouncing, and the windows were fogged. R. 225:158, 208-09; R. 226:303, 342.
Camilla opened the driver's door, and Myla looked inside to find Mele and
Defendant, whom she recognized, both naked. R. 225:159-60, 209; R. 226:342.
Camilla also looked inside and recognized Defendant in the back seat. R. 225:209.
Magic opened the rear passenger door, found the couple, and took a swing at
Defendant, hitting him in the face. R. 225:160-61; R. 226:304-05,345. Defendant got
out of the car to confront Magic, and Camilla yelled at Magic to get back in their car.
R. 225:210, 212; R. 226:306-07. The three left to return to their party in Kearns. R.
225:161, 210,212.

6

Magic and Mele were cousins but often referred to one another as brother
and sister. R. 225:160-61; R. 226:296-97, 334.
8

The "apology"

Defendant called My la and told her that he wanted to come over "to
apologize^]" R. 226:346. She yelled at him, and then hung up. R. 226:346-47. Over
the next few minutes, Defendant called her back several times, only to have her
hang up on him. Id. Defendant told Mele to drive him to Glendale "to get some of
his boys . . . just in case [Mele's] family jumped him or just in case anything
happened at [Mele's] house." R. 226:347-48. Defendant gave her directions as they
drove, and had her park at the curb in a residential neighborhood. R. 226:347-48. A
lone man Mele tentatively identified at trial as co-defendant Kamoto got into the
back seat and spoke with Defendant in Tongan, a language Mele did not
understand. R. 226:349-50,358. Kamoto then left to get into the passenger side of a
silver Ford Taurus with another man at the wheel. R. 226:353,406. Someone had
recently pointed both men out to Mele from a distance, calling them "D-Locc" and
"D-Down" and noting that they were Defendant's "boys." R. 226:354,396-97,436,
438. Hence, she did not know their given names and was not sure which nickname
went with which person.7 R. 226:354, 404, 406,443.

7

When later asked to identify pictures of D-Down and D-Locc from a photo
line-up, Mele picked out the pictures of Maumau and Kamoto. R. 226:414-15.
9

Defendant directed Mele to drive to her house and told her the silver car
would follow them. R. 226:356,410. Defendant again started calling Myla, telling
her they were coming over to apologize. R. 226:359-60. Myla told him "no" and
kept hanging up on him. Id.
Myla agreed that Defendant and Mele had called numerous times wanting to
come to the Kearns house. R. 225:162-63, 213. As Mele pulled into the driveway,
Myla was standing on the driveway talking on the phone to Defendant. R. 225:163;
R. 226:360. Defendant got out of the car and walked toward Myla, saying he wanted
to apologize and talk to Magic. R. 225:163-64; R. 226:360-61. Myla, standing
between Defendant and the tarp covering the carport, refused to let him pass and
told him to leave. R. 225:163-64; R. 226:361-63. Defendant raised a shotgun, pointed
it toward Myla, and told her to move. R. 225:164-65; R. 226:362-63,365. She refused,
and, as Defendant advanced toward her with the gun pointed at her, she backed
toward the tarp trying to keep him out of the carport. R. 225:164-65; R. 226:362-63.
She backed up as he advanced and yelled loudly, "Magic, he has a gun[!]" R.
226:308.
Magic and Camilla were in the carport listening to the radio and having a
drink when Defendant arrived. R. 226:308. Myla's yell made them look up, and
they saw her backing into the carport, followed by Defendant holding a gun in the
10

tarp opening beyond her. R. 226:308.

Myla, who had her back to Magic and

Camilla, stood between them and Defendant.

R. 226:308, 310-12.

Magic

immediately grabbed Camilla and hit the floor, trying to get her under cover. R.
226:313. He heard the gunshot a second or two later. R. 225:165; R. 226:313,325-26.
Defendant did not say a word. R. 226:312.
Defendant's "Boys"
Both Mele and Myla had noticed the silver car pull up to the curb shortly after
Defendant first approached Myla. R. 225:166; R. 226:360. Two men emerged from
the car carrying guns and wearing blue bandanas over their faces so that only their
eyes were visible. R. 225:166-68; R. 226:360,362-67,414,420. Myla later explained
that she did not see either man shoot their weapon, and she did not recognize them.
R. 225:166-68.
Mele, however, saw a bit more. She saw Myla, then Defendant, go through
the opening in the tarp, heard the shotgun blast from the carport, then heard
multiple shots coming from behind her. R. 226:365,421-25,433. Looking, she saw
D-Locc and D-Down near the silver car shooting toward the house, and she saw the
shots hitting the window. R. 226:366-68. Defendant ran past Mele toward the silver
car, and Mele saw him shoot once toward the front of the house. R. 226:425,430-31,
434. She got out and ran after him toward the silver car, yelling at Defendant to
11

leave. R. 226:368. As she neared the silver car, Defendant opened the door to get in.
R. 226:369. The door hit Mele in the stomach, knocking her to the ground. Id.
Tlte Aftermath
Magic heard half a dozen gunshots from outside the carport and kept Camilla
down until the shots were finished. R. 226:314. He then tried to pursue Defendant,
but Myla and Camilla grabbed him and kept him in the carport until the police
arrived. R. 226:315. They ultimately left the carport to find several shotgun shells,
police officers, holes in the front of the house, and Mele lying in the street in front of
the driveway. R. 226:316,319,329. Myla, angry with Mele for bringing Defendant
to the house, yelled at her and punched her in the face, giving her a bloody nose. R.
226:369-72.
Mele was taken to the hospital, where she not only gave a written statement
to police, but added to the evening's events a claim that Defendant had raped her.
R. 226:388-89,441. She later explained that she lied about the rape because she knew
her actions that night had "caused the shooting/7 she was scared, and she did not
want it to be her fault. R. 226:388-89, 393-94.
The Investigation
Outside the home, police found fired and unfired rifle ammunition, 12-gauge
shotgun hulls and holes in the front window consistent with a single shotgun blast
12

and two rifle fires. R. 226:460-66, 488, 491. Evidence inside the living room was
consistent with the shots having been fired from outside the home into the living
room. R. 226:473-74. They also found shotgun fire on the ceiling inside the carport
and a hole in the top part of the tarp covering the carport. R. 226:465, 486. The
evidence established that at least two weapons had been used. R. 226:478-79. The
police investigation revealed that "D-Locc" was the T.C.G. moniker for Danial
Maumau and "D-Down" was the T.C.G. moniker for David Kamoto. R. 226:498.
The shotgun was never found, and no prints were found on the ammunition. R.
226:477, 513-14.
The Expert
Detective Break Merino, the last witness called by the State, testified as an
expert on the T.C.G. R. 226:518-23. In addition to outlining his training and
teaching in gang-related subjects, he explained his relevant work experience over
the previous ten years. R. 226:518-23. Before working nearly nine years in law
enforcement, he worked in schools as a gang counselor and security officer,
interacting with kids and trying to diffuse gang-related situations. R. 226:518-19.
One of the gangs he dealt with was T.C.G., a largely Polynesian gang found
predominantly in Glendale. R. 226:519-20. When he started work with Salt Lake
City as a police officer, he had "[c]ontinuous[]" contact with T.C.G. because for
13

more than four years, his patrol encompassed the Glendale area and required that
he interact with its members to ensure that "they weren't carrying guns or
participating [sic] or getting ready to do anything to anybody else." R. 226:519-20.
He then spent two years with the gang suppression unit charged with patrolling
Salt Lake City, looking for and interacting with gang members, and obtaining
information, all with the goal of suppressing their activities. R. 226:520-21. Again,
he "[cjontinuously" interacted with T.C.G. members. R. 226:521. Finally, he
transferred to the gang investigations unit where he investigated gang activity,
developed confidential informants, and gathered "as much information on our gang
problem as possible[.]" R. 226:521. He was assigned to focus exclusively on T.C.G.
and was involved in "hundreds of investigations with the Tongan Crips." R.
226:522-23.
After the prosecutor laid this foundation without any objection from counsel,
she offered the detective as an expert on T.C.G. R. 226:523. Both defense counsel
objected, and the court admitted his testimony based on its pre-trial ruling. R.
226:523. The officer then defined a gang as being "two or more people acting in
concert... for the furtherance of a group . . . or a gang" and noted that gangs are
involved in criminal activity. R. 226:523-24. He explained the characteristics of
T.C.G. members, including their age-range, their "common clothing," their gang
14

color, their particular tattoos, their use of bandanas, their monikers, and the
significance behind each. R. 226:524-27. Based on his testimony and his prior
experience, he identified the monikers of the Defendant and his co-defendants and
their gang-related tattoos. R. 226:527-31.
Tlte Defense
Defendant presented two witnesses who testified that he had an alibi for the
time of the charged shooting. R. 227:572-92. Both claimed to have seen him at a
family party on the morning of February 3, 2007. R. 227:572-75, 584-88. The first
loved Defendant as a "brother" and would do "[wjhat's best for him." R. 227:58081. He testified that Defendant was at the party "the whole night[,]" although "he
could have snuck out[.]" R. 227:572-74,579. The second was a distant relative who
claimed he did not drink that night and that there was nothing memorable about
that particular party. R. 227:589-90. Yet he remembered seeing Defendant there at
6:40 in the morning. R. 227:587. Both had heard of the charges against Defendant
months earlier, but neither mentioned to anyone that Defendant had an alibi for the
time of the shooting until they were contacted by the defense two weeks before trial.
R. 227:581-83, 590-92.

15

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that once the trial court bifurcated the restricted person
charge, the court's subsequent references to restricted status when addressing the
jury amounted to reversible error. Appellate review of the claim is foreclosed,
however, because Defendant invited any error. Any error in referencing the status
when the court read the amended information to the jury venire was invited when
defense counsel affirmatively passed the jury for cause. Any error in the subsequent
references, which occurred when the trial court read jury instruction 5 to the jury,
was invited when defense counsel affirmatively represented that he had no
objection to the instructions. Even if the invited error doctrine did not preclude
review, the trial court cured any possible prejudice when, during deliberations, the
jury asked for "clarification" on the restricted person language, and the court
directed the jury not to concern itself with that language. There is no evidence the
jury did not follow the court's instruction.
Defendant fails to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing
a single cautionary instruction concerning the lunchtime altercation occurring
outside the presence of the jury. There is no evidence that any juror saw or heard the
incident, nothing in the court's instruction suggested the incident was in any way
gang related, the jury had not yet heard the State's gang expert testify, and the
16

instruction distanced the incident from this case and its participants. Neither is
there any evidence that removing five people from the crowded courtroom outside
the jury's presence was noticed by the jury or that it adversely affected their
deliberations. In any event, the jury's verdict demonstrated the absence of any
prejudice from the cautionary instruction.
The record amply supports the admission of Detective Merino's expert
testimony relative to T.C.G. and the gang membership of both defendants. First, it
established the identity of co-defendant Kamoto, who was identified as a participant
by an eyewitness who only knew his gang monikers. Second, it helped to establish
the in-concert enhancement for both defendants by demonstrating both the gangrelated meaning behind Kamoto's possession and use of a blue bandana during a
shooting involving a fellow gang member, and Defendant's knowledge of that
meaning.
Defendant's claim of cumulative error necessarily fails where he establishes
no error. Even if there were error, the trial court's swift action in each instance
successfully minimized any possible prejudice, and the jury's acquittal of the codefendant demonstrated that any error did not affect their deliberations.
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ARGUMENTS
I.
DEFENDANT INVITED ANY ERROR CONCERNING THE
"RESTRICTED PERSON" LANGUAGE THAT REACHED THE
JURY, THEREBY PRECLUDING APPELLATE REVIEW OF HIS
CLAIM
Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error by repeatedly
informing the jury that he was charged with being a restricted person,
notwithstanding the judge's earlier bifurcation of the restricted person charge. See
Aplt. Br. at 16-24. Defendant complains that after granting bifurcation, the judge
told the venire and thereafter told the jury in the preliminary and post-trial
instructions that Defendant was charged as a restricted person. See id. at 17,19.
That information, he argues, tainted the jury's view of the evidence, to his prejudice.
See id. at 20-21. He claims that he preserved this issue below, but argues that even if
he did not, he is entitled to plain error review. See id. at 22-24. Defendant, however,
is not entitled to even plain error review because he invited any alleged error.
A. The Invited Error Doctrine Precludes Appellate Review of
Defendant's Claim.
The invited error doctrine forecloses appellate review of this issue. The
doctrine "'prohibits parties from taking advantage of an error committed at trial
when that party led the trial court into committing the error.'" State v. Maese, 2010
UT App 106, \9,

P.3d

(quoting Newman v. White Water Whirlpool, 2008 UT
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79, Tf 14,197 P.3d 654) (additional citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, defense counsel not only failed to object to any of the trial court's references,
but he also affirmatively approved both the jury panel and the instruction from
which the references arose, thereby inviting any error.8
The relevant part of the amended information charges Defendant with the
"purchase, transfer, possession or use of a firearm by [a] restricted yerson[.]" R. 6
(capitalization removed; emphasis added).

All of the references challenged by

Defendant involve the trial court's repeating the same language, first to the venire,
then to the jury. All references occurred in Defendant's and his counsel's presence,
but neither objected to the statements, leaving the court unaware of the issue he
now raises. More importantly, defense counsel invited the errors by passing the
jury panel for cause, acknowledging that the jury was empanelled, and affirmatively
approving the preliminary jury instructions.
The first challenged reference occurred when the court "summarily read the
charges" to the venire from the amended information. R. 225:19-20. The remaining
references occurred after the jury was seated, and all of them relate to instruction 5,
which reflects the charges stated in the amended information and repeats the
8

Defendant makes no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relative to this

issue.
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"restricted person" language twice. R. 225:121, 124-25.9 The court read this
instruction aloud to the jury immediately before the beginning of trial and provided
the instruction to the jury in written form. R. 225:121,124-25,133-34.
The invited error doctrine precludes appellate review of the trial court's first
reference to "restricted person" status because: (1) defense counsel passed the jury
for cause (R. 225:98); and (2) when asked by the court if the eight jurors it ultimately
identified "represent[ed] the jury as selected[,]" defense counsel responded, "It
9

Instruction 5 provides (R. 133-34):

You are instructed that the defendant SITAMIPA ULISIS TOKI is
charged by the Information which has been duly filed with the
commission of DISCHARGE OF FIREARM FROM A VEHICLE, NEAR
HIGHWAY, OR IN DIRECTION OF ANY PERSON, BUILDING, OR
VEHICLE; PURCHASE, TRANSFER, POSSESSION OR USE OF A
FIREARM BY RESTRICTED PERSON; and AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.
The Information alleges:

COUNT II
PURCHASE, TRANSFER, POSSESSION OR USE OF A FIREARM BY
RESTRICTED PERSON, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about
February 3,2007, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 503(2)(a),
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
SITAMIPA ULISIS TOKI, a party to the offense, did purchase, transfer,
possess, use, or have under his custody or control any firearm.
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does, your Honor" (R. 225:115). By so doing, counsel affirmatively conceded that
the reading of the information had not biased the jury. See State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, \
20,128 P.3d 1179 (holding that similar language invited any error in the composition
of the jury); State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 17, & n.3,128 P.3d 1171 (applying the
invited error doctrine to an appellate claim of juror bias where the jury was passed
for cause). Defendant does not demonstrate that the single, passing reference at the
beginning of jury selection had any meaning to the prospective jurors such that it
created "'a bias or conflict of interest so strong or unequivocal as to inevitably taint
the trial process/" See Winfield, 2006 UT 4,117, n.3 (quoting State v. Litlwrland, 2000
UT 76, Tf 32,12 P.3d 92) (providing an exception to application of the invited error
doctrine injury selection situations). Accordingly, if there was error in the pre-trial
reference, Defendant invited it and has, therefore, waived appellate review of it. See
id. at Tf 21.
As to the remaining references, the invited error doctrine was implicated
when the parties discussed the preliminary instructions immediately before they
were read to the jury. R. 225:117-20. The prosecutor specifically addressed
Instruction 5 in light of the bifurcation ruling, requesting omission of language
referencing that Defendant had been "on probation or parole for any felony[.]" R.
225:118-19. The judge readily agreed to omit the language from the instruction and
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thanked counsel for pointing out the problem. R. 225:119. Defendant's counsel said
nothing. Id. After additional discussion concerning the instructions, the following
exchange occurred:
THE COURT:
. . . No, we'll take those a little bit later, but t h i s this preliminary set, I will read Instruction 1 through 18.
[DEFENDANTS COUNSEL]: That's fine, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay. Good. Thank you. We'll be in recess.

R. 225:120. The record reflects no other discussion concerning instruction 5.
Defense counsel's affirmative representation that he approved the reading of
the preliminary instructions, including instruction 5, encouraged the trial court to
proceed not only with reading the instruction, but also disseminating it to the jury,
without further concern for its content. As a result, counsel necessarily led the trial
court into committing what he now assigned as error. He is therefore precluded
from obtaining appellate review of the matter.10 See Maese, 2010 UT App 106, I f 912.

Defendant does not address the invited error doctrine, but contends that he
preserved his claim by filing his motion to sever the "restricted person" charge and
by "implicitly" joining in the request of Kamoto's counsel to remove the restricted
person language, thereby doing all "that could be done to alert the judge" to the
problem. Aplt. Br. at 22. That is not the case. He cites to the part of the
proceedings, after deliberations had begun, when Kamoto's counsel informed the
22

B. Any Error was Harmless.
Even if the invited error doctrine did not apply, the claim would fail for lack
of prejudice. Under the facts at hand, any possible confusion or prejudice caused by
the references to Defendant's restricted person status was cured by the trial court's
subsequent direction to the jury to disregard the information.

During their

deliberations, the jurors sent out three questions:
1. We need clarification on "restricted person."
2. Instruction 38 states Toki must be shown to have in possession,
custody or control a "firearm." Why is that illegal until used for a
crime?
3. If found guilty of count I[,] does that make count II apply[?]
R. 107A. After discussion with counsel, the court sent back the following response:

trial court of the need to remove "restricted person language" from the verdict form.
R. 227:663-64. As with all discussions concerning removal of such language, the trial
court readily agreed. Id. Defendant's counsel made no comment on the matter, and
nothing else suggests that, by his silence, he joined in the suggestion. Nor did the
discussion alert the trial court to any of the previous references Defendant now
challenges on appeal. On the contrary, defense counsel's severance request,
followed by his complete silence in the face of efforts by both the prosecutor and
Kamoto's counsel to remove all references to Defendant's restricted status, suggests
that defense counsel sought to inject into the proceedings an error he could argue on
appeal should the jury convict his client. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11,10
P.3d 346 (indicating that the preservation rule is meant, in part, to prevent defense
counsel from strategically foregoing an objection only to argue error on appeal
following a conviction).
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Do not concern yourself with the language of "restricted
person", [sic]
Pursuant to instruction No. 38[,] your verdict only requires you
to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether on or about February
3,2007 defendant Sitamipa Toki intentionally or knowingly possessed
or had under his control a firearm.
As to each count, you must separately determine the guilt or
innocence.
R. 108; R. 227:668-69. Defendant agreed with the response. R. 227:668-69.
The note demonstrates that the jury initially did not consider the question of
Defendant's restricted status because it felt it lacked sufficient information. In fact,
nothing in the record defined the phrase for the jury. When the jury requested
additional information, it was told not to concern itself with the issue. We assume
that the jury followed that instruction. See State v. Johnson, 2009 UT App 382, ^f 42,
224 P.3d 720 (citation omitted); see also State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App.
1992) ("In the absence of the appearance of something persuasive to the contrary,
we assume that the jurors were conscientious in performing [. . .] their duty, and
that they followed the instructions of the court.") (quotation and citation omitted;
alteration added). Defendant provides no basis on which to assume that the jury
ignored this directive and went on to consider his restricted status. Nor could he,
given that the jury was not instructed on the meaning of "restricted status" and did
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not hear any evidence that Defendant was a restricted person. Consequently, the
trial court appropriately cured any possible problem generated by the unintentional
references to Defendant's restricted status, and Defendant suffered no prejudice.
II.
THE JUDGE EXERCISED PROPER DISCRETION IN
PROVIDING A SINGLE CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION
CONCERNING THE LUNCHTIME ALTERCATION
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it rejected
his request to question each of the jurors concerning the lunchtime altercation
outside the courtroom on the second day of the trial and, instead, gave a single
curative instruction to the jury as a whole.11 See Aplt. Br. at 24-30. He argues that
the jurors "could have" heard or seen the altercation, that the altercation adversely
affected the jury by suggesting gang involvement, and that the trial court's curative
instruction not only failed to remedy the "significant" potential for prejudice
presented by the incident, but heightened the possibility of prejudice by suggesting
that "gang members aligned with either the defendants or the witnesses" were
involved. See id. at 24-25, 28-29.

Defense counsel preserved the issue when, after opining that individual
questionnaires and in camera review was acceptable, he noted "for the record" that
he was "opposed to" giving a cautionary instruction instead. R. 226:381-82, 385.
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"A trial court generally has broad discretion to respond to events in the
courtroom and control the proceedings before it." State v. Berry, 2006 UT App 332U,
13 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5 (2002)), cert denied, 150 P.3d 544 (Utah 2006); see
also State v. Tueller, 2001 UT App 317, \ 12, 37 R3d 1180 ("[W]e conclude that the
trial judge acted within his discretion in responding to events in his courtroom/').
Moreover, "[t]rial courts have the discretion to determine whether a curative
instruction is required in a particular case." State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 925
(Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted).
Defendant fails to establish that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial
court abused its discretion in choosing to address the hallway altercation by
providing a single curative instruction to the jury.
Defendant's arguments fail for several reasons. First, his claim that the
incident "impacted on the jurors' impartiality" is entirely speculative and
unsupported by the record, thereby undermining his claim of prejudice. See Aplt.
Br. at 27. He provides no evidence that any of the jurors saw or heard the
altercation or knew anything more than was mentioned in the court's instruction.
The record reveals that the situation was addressed twice below. The first
time was just before the jury reconvened after the lunchtime altercation. R. 226:37386. At that time, the court suggested that the jurors were likely to be "totally
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oblivious" to the incident or, at worst, had simply heard it. R. 226:377-82. The court
then determined, with the agreement of counsel for the State and the co-defendant,
that it was "more reasonable" under the circumstances to provide a single, neutral
curative instruction than to risk the unnecessary emphasis provided by individual
voir dire. R. 226:382-84. The court's instruction stated:
Let me, before we resume with our next witness or with our witness
who is in the process of providing testimony, indicate to our jury that
we had an altercation in the hallway outside of our courtroom over the
lunch recess[.] I don't know if any of you overheard it or not, it didn't
involve any of the witnesses or the parties in this particular case. And I
wanted to advise you of that and simply let you know that it didn't
involve people who are central, in terms of this case.
R. 226:386.
The court also ordered, before the jury convened, that "anybody... under the
age of 30" would be excluded from the courtroom. R. 226:385. No one objected to
this decision, which was made because:

(1) it was feared that clearing the

courtroom of spectators would cause concern to the jurors; (2) only three young
males and the females with them were thought to be involved in the incident; and
(3) the thirty-year limit would result in removal of only "five audience members"
out of a "courtroom... full [to] capacity" and full of Polynesians, thereby rendering
the fact of the removal unobtrusive to the jury. R. 204; R. 226:379,381-85.
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The matter was addressed a second time when, after the jury rendered its
verdict, Defendant sought access to juror information to determine "whether the
Brawl Incident and the courtroom clearing influenced the jury[.]" R. 174.

In

support of the motion, defense counsel submitted an affidavit in which he attested
that he heard the courthouse cafeteria staff discussing "the Brawl outside
'Skanchy's' courtroom[,]" and that he saw a juror in the cafeteria at the time. R. 183.
The trial court determined that there was no evidence before it that any of the jurors
saw the altercation, and that even if they heard of the incident, the curative
instruction "minimized any possibility of prejudice." Add. B at 3; R. 204.
The record fully supports the trial court's assessment. The initial discussion
between the parties and the court immediately following the altercation was no
more than speculation concerning what, if anything, the jurors might have seen or
heard. R. 226:373-86. The incident occurred in front of the courtroom within the
two sets of double doors, thereby rendering it invisible to anyone waiting for an
elevator, while the jurors had exited through the back of the courtroom. R. 186; R.
226:373-74, 377. The bailiff noted that when the jurors returned from lunch, "no
one's said anything" about the incident. R. 226:376. No one could place a single
juror within sight of the incident, and no one established that even a single juror
heard the incident. Even defense counsel's subsequent affidavit does not establish
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that the juror in the cafeteria was in a position to hear any of the discussion about
the incident or that the discussion involved any information beyond the fact and
location of the altercation. R. 183. On this record, it is entirely speculative to
believe that the jury knew anything more about the altercation than was contained
in the trial court's cautionary instruction and that there was, therefore, any
additional bias that went unaddressed by the instruction.
Second, Defendant's reliance on the ruling in United States v. Mannie, 509 F.3d
851 (7th Cir. 2007), is entirely unpersuasive. See Aplt. Br. at 25-27,29. hi Mannie, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that particularly egregious courtroom
behavior presented an "impermissible risk" that Mannie's convictions on two drug
charges and a weapons charge were improperly based on the jury's perception of
Mannie as a "violent gangster[.]" 509 F.3d at 852,857; see Aplt. Br. at 26. However,
that ruling was based on "a unique set of circumstances" in which "the courtroom
behavior and atmosphere spiraled out of control" and became "so prejudicial, that
no amount of voir dire and cautionary instructions [could] remedy the defect."
Mannie, 509 F.3d at 856-57. The circumstances in Mannie included: one of the
jointly-tried defendants wearing prison attire, verbally assaulting his attorneys and
repeatedly disrupting trial proceedings; a violent courtroom brawl in front of the
jury; juror reports of individuals believed to be gang members making gang signs
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from the gallery with Mannie; juror reports of other assumed gang members in the
gallery staring at jurors; and a government theory that the defendants were
dangerous members of a street gang. See id. at 854-57.
The fact that Mannie was found to have been deprived of a fair trial in the
face of such egregious courtroom behavior provides no guidance in this case,
because none of the same circumstances exist here. In contrast to the egregious
behavior in the jury's presence in Mannie, this case involves a single altercation
occurring entirely outside the jury's presence and no record evidence that a single
juror saw or heard the exchange. Moreover, nothing tied the exchange to gang
activity except the concern voiced by counsel in their discussion with the trial judge.
More importantly, the trial judge here timely gave a curative instruction with the
agreement of two of the three parties in the case.
Finally, Defendant contends that the instruction itself "heightened the
possibility" of prejudice from the incident because it not only suggested that the
incident was related to this case, but hinted that both the incident and Defendant
had some relationship to gangs. See Aplt. Br. at 28-30. His claim lacks any record
support and is contrary to the plain language of the instruction. The instruction
acknowledges only the existence and the location of the otherwise unexplained
incident and adds no information that could be prejudicial to Defendant. In fact, the
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instruction distances the incident from this case by placing it in the hallway outside
the courtroom instead of between the courtroom doors. R. 226:386. The instruction
further distances the altercation from this case by properly informing the jury that
none of the witnesses or the parties in this case was involved in the incident. See id.
Defendant fails to establish that individual voir dire would have better minimized
the impact of the altercation.
In addition, Defendant's claim that the instruction suggested the involvement
of gangs acting on behalf of the defendants in this case is illogical and
unpersuasive.12 See Aplt. Br. at 28-29. Nothing in the instruction refers to gangs.
R. 226:386. The gang-related evidence from Detective Merino had not yet been
presented, and the jury heard from four other witnesses before he was called to the
stand. Nothing in the record suggests that any of the courtroom spectators were
gang members, let alone that the jury recognized them as such.

The parties noted

12

The State's theory was not, as Defendant claims, that Toki and Kamoto were
"dangerous members of a street gang/' Aplt. Br. at 26 (quotation omitted). Instead,
it was that Defendant sought revenge for Magic's assault on him and that the
membership of all three defendants in the same gang and their active use of the
gang's blue bandanas during the shooting established the in-concert enhancement
charge.
13

Defendant's Deseret News report of the incident was not before the trial
court, and its details are without verification in this record. See Aplt. Br. at 27 n.l.
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the presence in the crowded courtroom of numerous family members, while the
judge commented that there were numerous Polynesians "intermingled amongst
each other[,]" and enough people present and moving around that it was not likely
that "a small group of people... would be immediately identifiable with one or the
other'7 of the defendants. R. 226:379-83. In fact, defense counsel commented below
that the people involved in the altercation "definitely weren't people that the jury
knows." R. 226:379.
Ultimately, Defendant suggests that the clearing of the courtroom of "all
people under the age of thirty" combined with the curative instruction to send the
jury "a clear message" that the altercation was "significant" and related to this case.
Aplt. Br. at 29. Defendant's failure to object to the clearing of the courtroom below
waived appellate review of its impact on the jury. See In re Discipline of Alex, 2004
UT 81, If 21 n. 2, 99 P.3d 865 ("[A] party is said to 'waive' a claim on appeal if that
claim was not preserved in the trial court[.]") (citation omitted); LMVLeasing, Inc. v.
Conlin, 805 R2d 189,197-98 (Utah App 1991) ("'If something occurs which the party
thinks is wrong and so prejudicial to him that he thereafter cannot have a fair trial,
he must make his objection promptly and seek redress . . . or be held to waive
whatever rights may have existed to do so.'") (quoting Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc.,
787 P.2d 525, 527 (Utah App 1990) (additional quotation omitted)).
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Regardless, the exclusion occurred before the jury re-convened, and it
translated to exclusion of only "five audience members involved in the brawl" out
of a "courtroom . .. full [to] capacity" and full of Polynesians. R. 204; R. 226:379;
Aplt. Br. at 29. The trial judge expressly noted that he "did not clear the audience of
Islanders[,]" and he did not remove anyone in the jury's presence.

R. 204.

Moreover, defense counsel's acknowledgement that the jury "definitely" didn't
know the people involved in the brawl suggests that the jury is unlikely to recognize
that the same people were no longer in the courtroom. R. 226:379. Defendant offers
nothing to establish that the jurors ever noticed the absence of these individuals
from the crowded courtroom, let alone interpreted it as anything more than
evidence that they had other obligations for the afternoon.
In any event, his claim that the altercation and the curative instruction
resulted in prejudice is undercut by the fact that, on the same evidence, the jury
convicted Defendant and acquitted his co-defendant on the charge of discharging a
firearm with an in-concert enhancement. R. 112-13. Similarly, prejudice is unlikely
where the jury acquitted Defendant of aggravated assault and convicted him of the
lesser included offense of threatening with a dangerous weapon. Id. See State v.
Kocher, 1999 UT App 352U, *2 (finding no prejudice from a witness' improper
comment on inadmissible evidence that was properly stricken and addressed with a
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curative instruction where the jury acquitted defendant of theft and convicted him
of a lesser included offense). The jury's verdict demonstrates that its members were
able to set aside any unfair impact generated by the altercation, thereby defeating
Defendant's claim of prejudice.
Accordingly, Defendant fails to establish that the cautionary instruction was
inadequate and amounted to an abuse of discretion.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EXPERT
TESTIMONY BECAUSE IT WAS RELEVANT TO IDENTITY
AND TO THE IN-CONCERT ENHANCEMENT CHARGE, AND
ITS PROBATIVE VALUE FAR OUTWEIGHED ANY DANGER
OF UNFAIR PREJUDICE
Defendant challenges the trial court's admission of expert testimony from
Detective Break Merino concerning gang monikers and the T.C.G. See Aplt. Br. at
30-36. Specifically, he argues that the detective's "extensive testimony" was not
probative of any element of the charged crimes, was cumulative of evidence
concerning the in-concert charge, and was unfairly prejudicial because any
probative value it might have had was substantially outweighed by the risk of
unfair prejudice.14 See id.
14

Defendant challenged the gang evidence below under rule 404(b), Utah
Rules of Evidence. R. 170, 204-06. He does not renew that claim on appeal. See
Aplt. Br. at 30-36. Neither does he argue that the detective's testimony was
34

Relevant evidence is generally admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 402.
Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence/' Utah R. Evid. 401. "[T]he
standard for determining the relevancy of evidence is very low, and even evidence
with the slightest probative value is relevant." State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, f 34,44
P.3d 805 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Relevant evidence is inadmissible, however, "if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Utah R. Evid. 403.
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has "an undue tendency to suggest decision on
an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." State v.
Maurer, 770 P.2d 981,984 (Utah 1989) (additional internal quotation marks omitted).
A trial court is granted discretion in determining questions of relevance and the
balancing of probative and prejudicial values. State v. Schwenke, 2009 UT App 345, ^
9,222 P.3d 768, cert, denied, 230 P.3d 127 (Utah 2010). This Court will reverse the
trial court's decision only upon a finding of an abuse of discretion. See id.

inadmissible as expert testimony under rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence. See id.
The trial court clarified that there was no challenge to the detective's testimony as
being expert testimony. R. 225:10-11.
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A. Rule 402 — Relevance
The trial court properly determined that Detective Merino's testimony was
relevant to both identity and the in-concert enhancement charge. R. 225:14-16. It
was necessary to establish the identity of co-defendant Kamoto because only Mele
was able to put Kamoto at the scene of the shooting, and she did not know his given
name. She knew only the monikers of the two men in the silver car, and even then
could not identify which moniker belonged to which man.

The detective's

testimony made the necessary connection between Kamoto and the moniker "DDown," and the detective's ability to make that connection rested squarely on his
expertise with the T.C.G.
With regard to Defendant, the detective's testimony was necessary to
establish the in-concert enhancement charge leveled against both defendants. That
charge required that the State prove more than the mere presence of two or more
people. The State had to prove that: (1) two or more people aided or encouraged
the Defendant; (2) Defendant knew he was being aided by both people; and (3) both
were either present or participated as a party to the offense. See Utah Code Ann.
§76-3-203.1 (West 2004). The State's theory was that D-Down and D-Locc showed
up to aid or encourage Defendant, not simply as friends, but as fellow gang
members. Both defendants pled not guilty, and Defendant claimed an alibi,
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requiring the State to prove all the elements of the charges against each defendant.
See State v. Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366,369 (Utah App. 1996).
Through Myla and Mele, the State put all three men at the scene of the
shooting at the same time. Both women saw two men exit the silver car with blue
bandanas on their faces and guns in their hands. But only Mele could identify them,
and only Mele saw them use the guns they held. R. 226:365-67. The men said
nothing. No one saw Defendant talk to them at the scene or indicate familiarity in
any way until they fled together. No one saw a blue bandana in Defendant's
possession. And although Mele testified about Defendant's meeting with D-Down
before the shooting, she was unable to explain what they had talked about because
they conversed in Tongan. Finally, Mele had been drinking heavily and admitted
that she had lied when she claimed that Defendant raped her.
Given the State's burden of showing that the men acted in concert at the time
of the shooting and the credibility concerns caused by Mele's drinking that night,
the detective's testimony filled the evidentiary gaps for the in-concert enhancement
charge and corroborated Mele's identification testimony. The detective was able to
establish that the possession and use of the blue bandanas under the circumstances
would be viewed by members of T.C.G. as "putting in work" on behalf of the gang,
and that the three defendants in this case would view it accordingly, given their
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common gang membership. R. 226:527. He established the connection between
Kamoto and Maumau—their membership in the T.C.G.—that explained why both
would have and use a blue bandana in such a way. He gave context to Defendant's
comment to Mele on the drive to Glendale that he needed to get some of "[h]is
boys" "in case anything happened at [her] house." R. 226:348-54, 516, 527-31.
Together with evidence of Defendant's hasty retreat with the co-defendants
immediately after the shooting, the detective's testimony made it more likely than
not that the three men were acting in concert at the scene of the shooting.
B. Rule 403 - Balancing Analysis
Although relevant, evidence may be inadmissible when its probative value "is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403. Here, the trial
court determined that the evidence was "more probative than prejudicial in the
context of the facts" in this case. R. 225:16. He reiterated that ruling when he
denied Defendant's new trial motion. R. 205-06.
Defendant argues that the gang-related information was unfairly prejudicial
because it provided "extensive" evidence that the T.C.G., and Defendant by
extension, was involved in criminal activity. See Aplt. Br. at 34-35. He points
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particularly to the information offered below as foundation for establishing the
detective's expertise, including his experience in gang suppression and gang
investigation units. See id. at 34-35; R. 226:518-23. This evidence, he argues, allowed
the jury to convict him because he was a gang member. See Aplt. Br. at 35.
While there is generally some danger of prejudice arising from informing the
jury of a defendant's membership in a gang, that prejudice is not necessarily unfair.
See Woods v. Zeluff, 2007 UT App 84, | 7,158 P.3d 552 (even "highly prejudicial"
testimony may be admissible; it is not the existence of prejudice but the danger of
unfair prejudice that determines admissibility). In this case, the trial court queried
the State concerning the anticipated testimony, heard from both parties concerning
the probative and prejudicial value of that testimony, and properly determined that
any possible prejudice did not substantially outweigh the high probative value of
the detective's gang evidence. R. 225:9-16.

The record amply supports that

determination.
First, the information concerning Detective Merino's gang-related background
was necessary to establish his status as an expert and was received without any
objection by defense counsel. R. 226:518-23. That information necessarily revealed
that gangs were involved in criminal activity, that certain units of the police force
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specialized in handling gang activity, and that the detective had experience in those
units specifically dealing with T.C.G.
Second, nothing in the detective's testimony attributed any criminal conduct
to Defendant or suggested a status in the gang that would have provided him some
degree of responsibility or authority in a gang. Neither did the detective attribute
any particular criminal conduct to the T.C.G. or highlight any particular experience
with the gang that would have generated overmastering hostility in the jury.
Third, the judge remained mindful of the need to carefully restrict improper
gang references, sustaining several objections to gang-related evidence.15 R. 226:43637, 529, 531. Although the judge gave no particular jury instruction dealing with
consideration of gang-related evidence, none was requested, and the absence of one
is not raised as error on appeal.
Fourth, in closing arguments, both the prosecutor and Kamoto's counsel
expressly directed that the jury was not to base a conviction on gang membership.
R. 227:622,654-55. The prosecutor explained that gang membership was "important
. . . because it goes toward . . . identification" and because it relates to whether the

15

There was no express ruling on Defendant's objection to a discussion of his
gang-related tattoos, but the court called a bench conference after which the
prosecutor re-directed her questioning. R. 226:528-29.
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men "act[ed] in concert[.]" R. 227:622.

Such express cautioning necessarily

minimized the risk of a conviction improperly based on gang association.
Finally, the most telling evidence that the trial court properly evaluated the
potential prejudice from the challenged evidence lies in the jury's verdict. The
challenged evidence was admitted with respect to both defendants, yet the jury
convicted Defendant of discharging a firearm, together with the in-concert
enhancement, and acquitted Kamoto. R. 112-13. Such a result was unlikely if the
jury had been roused to overmastering hostility by the gang evidence. Instead, it
demonstrates that the jury followed the direction of the court and counsel and
evaluated the evidence before it.
In light of these factors, any possible prejudice arising from the gang-related
evidence did not substantially outweigh the high probative value of the evidence.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to
introduce Detective Merino's testimony.
IV.
THERE IS NO CUMULATIVE ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL
Defendant claims that "the cumulative effect of the errors in this case requires
a new triar because it "cause[dj the jurors to disbelieve Toki's defense/7 to his
prejudice. Aplt. Br. at 36-37.
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"A reviewing court will reverse a jury verdict under the cumulative error
doctrine only if the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines . . .
confidence that a fair trial was had." State v. Gallegos, 2009 UT 42, f 39,220 P.3d 136
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, f 56,
191 P.3d 17.
For the reasons already argued, Defendant fails to show any error occurred;
thus, the Court need not consider whether the cumulative effect of the challenged
actions undermines confidence in the outcome. See Gallegos, 2009 UT 42, % 39.
But even if error occurred, Defendant fails to establish that it was prejudicial
or in any way undermined confidence that "a fair trial was had/ 7 Id. (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). The trial court took appropriate steps to
minimize any possible prejudice from all the errors alleged by Defendant (see
Arguments I through III, supra). And the jury's acquittal of co-defendant and fellow
gang member Kamoto demonstrates that the jurors were able to focus their
deliberations on the facts before them.
Moreover, the jury's rejection of the alibi defense was not the result of the
alleged errors, but of the evidence adduced at trial, which included four
eyewitnesses who placed Defendant at the crime scene. Additionally, defense
counsel called the situation "a set-up [,]" arguing to the jury that the State's
42

witnesses fabricated both the shooting and Defendant's involvement because they
found him in the SUV with Mele. By so doing, counsel conceded that Defendant left
whatever party he was attending to be with Mele. R. 227:629-640. This argument
undermined the testimony of one of the alibi witnesses that Defendant was at a
family party "the whole night/7 R. 227:574. Further, the testimony of both alibi
witnesses was less than persuasive. Both were related to Defendant—one distant
and one so close that he loved Defendant as a brother—and both testified that they
remembered him being at an unremarkable family birthday party a year-and-a-half
earlier during the time he was alleged to have been committing the charged crime.
R. 227:572-74, 579-81, 587-88, 590. Yet, despite having known for more than six
months that Defendant had been charged, neither mentioned the alibi to anyone
until contacted by defense counsel within the two weeks before trial. R. 227:580-83,
587-92.
Accordingly, the cumulative effect of the challenged actions does not
undermine confidence in the outcome, and Defendant's claim of cumulative error
fails.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's convictions.
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ADDENDUM A
UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 402
UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 403

R U L E 402. RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE; IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.

RULE 4 0 3 . EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

ADDENDUM B
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
(R. 202-07)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

vs.

s

SITAMIPA ULISIS TOKI,

CASE NO. 071901101

:
Judge Randall N. Skanchy

Defendant.

:

The Court has before it Defendant Sitamipa Toki's Motion for
New Trial and Extension of New Trial Hearing, Disclosure of Juror
Location Information.

The matter has been fully briefed by the

parties and oral arguments were held April 20, 2009.

Accordingly,

the matter is ready for the Court's decision.
Background
A jury trial was held October 1-3, 2008.

The jury found Toki

guilty of Purchase/Possession of Dangerous Weapon by Restricted
Person, U.C.A. § 76-10-503, a second degree felony, and

Discharge

of Firearm, U.C.A. § 76-10-508, a second degree felony, with a
group enhancement conviction for acting in concert with another
party, U.C.A. § 76-3-203.1.

Toki was acquitted on an Aggravated

Assault charge, U.C.A. § 76-5-103.
Toki now requests a new trial.

Under Rule 24(a), Utah Rules

of Criminal Procedure, the Court may grant a new trial "in the
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interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had
a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party."

Toki

claims that he was denied a fair trial because the jury may have
been prejudiced.
potential
Pacific

He argues that: (1) the Court refused to question

jurors

in voir dire as to their opinions on gangs,

Islanders,

influenced

by

spectators

from

and

tattoos;

a hallway brawl
the

courtroom;

(2)

and

the

jury

subsequent

and

(3)

the

may

have

removal
State's

of

been
some

witness,

Detective Merino, improperly testified to Defendant's character.
Discussion
Toki first argues that the Court erred by refusing to ask
potential
Islanders,

jurors
gang

whether
members,

preserved the issue.

they
or

held

prejudices

tattoos.

The

toward

Defendant

Pacific
has

not

There is no evidence that Defendant made a

timely objection to the asserted error.

u

An objection to the

failure to make a requested voir dire inquiry is required so that
the trial court may correct its error before the jury is selected
and empaneled."
1989) .

Broberg v. Hess, 782 P. 2d 198, 201 (Utah Ct. App.

By passing the jury for cause, exercising his peremptory

challenges and acknowledging that the jury was empaneled, Defendant
"invited the alleged error" and cannot now cry foul.

State v.

McCloud, 2005 UT App 466, t 20, 126 P.3d 775; see also State v.
Miller, 674 P. 2d 130, 131

(Utah 1983)

(holding that failure to

timely object waives any defense) , State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, H 15,
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8 P.3d 1025; Brobercr at 201-02.
Defendant next argues that the jury may have become biased
against the Defendant because of a "brawl" that occurred in the
courthouse hallway among some members of the audience in his trial.
There is no evidence that the jurors witnessed the brawl.

The

Court, outside the presence of the jury, ordered five audience
members involved in the brawl to leave the courtroom prior to
resuming the trial.
not

Contrary to Defendant's claim, the Court did

clear the audience

instructed

of

Islanders.

The

Court

specifically

the jury that while they may have heard about

the

incident, it did not involve the defendants, parties or witnesses
in this case.

The Court's instruction was sufficient to overcome

any possible influence the brawl may have had on the jurors.

While

there is always a risk that an audience member may do or say
something inappropriate, the ucourt has to rely on the jury having
enough mental discipline

to disregard

things that they

should

disregard with proper instructions."

United States v. Sublet, 644

F.2d

The

737,

741

sufficiently

(8th

Cir.

prejudicial

1981).
to

be

incident

incurable,

here

and

the

was

not

Court's

instruction minimized any possibility of prejudice.
Lastly, Defendant argues that Detective Merino, the State's
expert witness, provided

improper

and prejudicial

evidence

violation of Utah Rules of Evidence 402, 403, and 404.
of Evidence

allow as admissible all relevant

in

The Rules

information

with
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Relevant

if the danger of unfair prejudice
Utah R.
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Evid.

evidence

may be excluded

substantially

probative

value.

403.

Rule

admitting

the accused's character or other

outweighs

404(b)

its

prohibits

"bad acts"

to

show

conformity with the accusation, but permits admitting the same for
other purposes such as showing identity, motive or opportunity.
The list of admissible uses for admitting bad acts is not
exhaustive.

Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, f 43, 190 P.3d 1269.

Rule

is an

404(b)

inclusionary

rule, meaning

it

includes

all

evidence unless it fits into the exception of evidence going toward
the defendant's general propensity to commit the crime charged.
Utah v. Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366, 369 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citations
omitted).
Defendant

argues

that

Detective

Merino's

testimony

of

Defendant's gang affiliation was prejudicial, not relevant, and
went to Defendant's character.
testified

The detective is a gang expert and

that based upon Defendant's

tattoos, use

of

a blue

bandana at the crime scene, and gang moniker, he was a member of
the Tongan Crip Gang.
establishing
charge.

the

The detective's testimony was relevant: to

elements

required

for

the

group

enhancement

By presenting himself as innocent of the crimes charged,

the Defendant put at issue a factual question of whether he was
aided by his co-defendant.

See Ramirez, 924 P. 2d at 369.

The

probative value of Detective Merino's testimony outweighed any

STATE v. TOKI

PAGE 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

prejudicial impact it may have had.
Order
The

Court

DENIES

Defendant's

Motion

for New

Trial

and

Extension of New Trial Hearing, Disclosure of Juror Location
Information. Defendant has not presented any error or impropriety
having a substantial adverse effect upon Defendant's rights.

DATED this_ill

day of April, 2009.

? "
\

Judge Randall/) N.^f$k"anchy ;£.£*
D i s t r i c t Court (huclge/\ 0 '
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